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A KURODA-STYLE j-TRANSLATION
BENNO VAN DEN BERG
Abstract. In topos theory it is well-known that any nucleus j gives rise to a translation of
intuitionistic logic into itself in a way which generalises the Go¨del-Gentzen negative trans-
lation. Here we show that there exists a similar j-translation which is more in the spirit
of Kuroda’s negative translation. The key is to apply the nucleus not only to the entire
formula and universally quantified subformulas, but to conclusions of implications as well.
The development is entirely syntactic and no knowledge of topos theory is required to read
this small note.
1. Introduction
Since everything which is provable in intuitionistic logic is also classically provable, but
not vice versa, it is natural to think of intuitionistic logic as a weakening of classical logic.
Nevertheless, it is also possible to think of intuitionistic logic as an extension of classical logic,
because there exist faithful copies of classical logic inside intuitionistic logic. Such an isomorphic
copy of classical logic inside intuitionistic logic is called a negative translation.
Let us define a negative translation more formally as a mapping ϕ 7→ ϕ∗ which sends formulas
in predicate logic to formulas in predicate logic such that the following two statements hold for
all formulas ϕ, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn and ψ:
(1) ⊢CQC ϕ↔ ϕ
∗
(2) If ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢CQC ψ, then (ϕ1)
∗, . . . , (ϕn)
∗ ⊢IQC ψ
∗.
(Here CQC stands for classical predicate logic, while IQC stands for intuitionistic predicate
logic. Note that (1) implies that the converse of (2) holds as well.) One well-known negative
translation is the Go¨del-Gentzen negative translation which puts double negations (¬¬) in
front of atomic formulas, disjunctions and existential quantifiers. A lesser known negative
translation is due to Kuroda which puts double negations in front of the entire formula and
behind universal quantifiers [6]. In a sense, these two translations are only syntactic variants of
each other, because the Go¨del-Gentzen and Kuroda negative translation of some formula are
intuitionistically equivalent. Since these negative translation extend to systems stronger than
logic (like arithmetic, for instance), they can be used to prove equiconsistency and conservativity
results for classical systems over intuitionistic analogues.
In topos theory the Go¨del-Gentzen negative translation has been generalised to general
nuclei (also known as local operators, or Lawvere-Tierney topologies). Essentially, a nucleus is
an operation on the collection of truth values which is monotone, inflationary, idempotent and
commutes with conjunction, with double negation being a prime example. Thinking of such
a nucleus j as an operation on formulas, we can define for each formula ϕ a new formula ϕj
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which is obtained by applying the j-operation to atomic formulas, disjunctions and existential
quantifiers, as in the Go¨del-Gentzen negative translation. The result is no longer a negative
translation; however, because we do still have
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢IQC ψ =⇒ (ϕ1)
j , . . . , (ϕn)
j ⊢IQC ψ
j ,
it provides a translation of intuitionistic logic into itself (often called the j-translation).
This much is well known. What does not seem to have been observed before is that something
similar is possible for the Kuroda negative translation. So let j be a nucleus and let ϕj be the
result of putting j in front of the entire formula, behind universal quantifiers and in front of
conclusions of implications. Then we have
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢IQC ψ =⇒ (ϕ1)j , . . . , (ϕn)j ⊢IQC ψj ,
so we again have a translation of intuitionistic logic into itself, a Kuroda-style j-translation.
In fact, ϕj and ϕ
j are intuitionistically equivalent. The fact that j also has to be applied to
conclusions of implications is related to the fact that the Kuroda negative translation does not
work as a translation of classical logic into minimal logic (constructive logic without the ex falso
rule ⊥ → ϕ), but the modified Kuroda translation which also puts double negations in front of
conclusions of implications does (as was apparently first observed by Ferreira and Oliva, see [5,
Section 6]). We will explain all of this more precisely below.
It turns out that the Kuroda-style j-translation explains some initially puzzling phenomena
in the literature, of which I will give a few examples, so I hope some readers may find this little
note illuminating. I will not give many proofs, because most of them are routine inductions on
the structure of a formula or a derivation.
2. Nuclei
Throughout this paper L is a logic which could be either CQC (classical predicate logic), IQC
(intuitionistic predicate logic), or MQC (minimal predicate logic). We assume that these logics
have been formulated with ∧,∨,→, ∃, ∀ and ⊥ as primitive, while ¬ϕ is defined as ϕ → ⊥.
Minimal logic can be axiomatised in natural deduction-style using the standard introduction
and elimination rules for the logical connectives, and with ϕ following from ϕ as the only axiom.
In minimal logic ⊥ has no special properties, so acts as an arbitrary propositional constant.
Intuitionistic logic is obtained from minimal logic by adding ex falso ⊥ → ϕ, while classical
logic is obtained from intuitionistic logic by adding the law of excluded middle ϕ∨¬ϕ or double
negation elimination ¬¬ϕ→ ϕ.
Definition 2.1. Let j be a function mapping formulas in predicate logic to formulas in predicate
logic. Such a mapping will be called a nucleus (relative to the logic L) if for all formulas ϕ and
ψ the following statements are provable in L:
⊢L ϕ→ jϕ
⊢L j(ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ( jϕ ∧ jψ )
⊢L (ϕ→ jψ)→ (jϕ→ jψ)
⊢L (jϕ)[t/x]↔ j(ϕ[t/x])
Example 2.2. The main example of a nucleus is the double-negation nucleus
jϕ: = ¬¬ϕ;
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more generally, we have that jϕ: = (ϕ → A) → A is a nucleus for any fixed sentence A (the
double-negation nucleus being the special case where A = ⊥). Other examples of nuclei are
jϕ : = ϕ ∨ A
jϕ : = A→ ϕ
jϕ : = (ϕ→ A)→ ϕ
for any fixed sentence A. Note that all of these examples are nuclei over MQC already.
Lemma 2.3. For any nucleus we can prove:
⊢L (ϕ→ ψ)→ (jϕ→ jψ)
⊢L jϕ↔ jjϕ
⊢L j(ϕ→ jψ)↔ (jϕ→ jψ)
⊢L j(jϕ ∨ jψ)↔ j(ϕ ∨ ψ)
⊢L j(∃x jϕ)↔ j(∃xϕ)
⊢L j(∀x jϕ)↔ ∀x jϕ
Proof. We only prove the third item, leaving the others (which are easier) to the reader.
Since
⊢L ((ϕ→ jψ) ∧ ϕ)→ jψ
the third and second axiom for a nucleus imply
⊢L (j(ϕ→ jψ) ∧ jϕ)→ jψ
which is equivalent to
⊢L j(ϕ→ jψ)→ (jϕ→ jψ).
Conversely, the first axiom for a nucleus implies
⊢L (ϕ→ jψ)→ j(ϕ→ jψ)
which in combination with
⊢L ϕ→ jϕ
implies
⊢L (jϕ→ jψ)→ j(ϕ→ jψ).

3. The Go¨del-Gentzen-style j-translation
Definition 3.1. Assume j is a nucleus. We define ϕj to be the formula defined by induction
on the structure of ϕ as follows:
ϕj : = jϕ if ϕ is an atomic formula
(ϕ ∧ ψ)j : = ϕj ∧ ψj
(ϕ ∨ ψ)j : = j(ϕj ∨ ψj)
(ϕ→ ψ)j : = ϕj → ψj
(∃xϕ)j : = j(∃xϕj)
(∀xϕ)j : = ∀xϕj
Then we have:
Proposition 3.2. (a) For any formula ϕ we have ⊢L j(ϕ
j)↔ ϕj .
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(b) ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢L ψ implies ϕ
j
1
, . . . , ϕjn ⊢L ψ
j.
Proposition 3.3. (a) If jϕ = (ϕ→ A)→ A, then ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢CQC ψ implies
ϕj
1
, . . . , ϕjn ⊢IQC ψ
j .
(b) If jϕ = (ϕ→ ⊥)→ ⊥, then ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢CQC ψ implies ϕ
j
1
, . . . , ϕjn ⊢MQC ψ
j.
(c) If jϕ = ϕ ∨⊥, then ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢IQC ψ implies ϕ
j
1
, . . . , ϕjn ⊢MQC ψ
j.
4. A Kuroda-style j-translation
Our aim in this section is to give an alternative presentation of ϕj , which brings it closer to
Kuroda’s negative translation. We do this as follows:
Definition 4.1. Let j be a nucleus. First we define Jϕ by induction on ϕ, as follows:
Jϕ ; = ϕ if ϕ is an atomic formula
J(ϕ ∧ ψ) : = Jϕ ∧ Jψ
J(ϕ ∨ ψ) : = Jϕ ∨ Jψ
J(ϕ→ ψ) : = Jϕ→ j(Jψ)
J(∃xϕ) : = ∃xJ(ϕ)
J(∀xϕ) : = ∀x j(Jϕ)
Finally, we set ϕj : = j(Jϕ).
Proposition 4.2. (a) We have ⊢L ϕ
j ↔ ϕj.
(b) ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢L ψ implies J(ϕ1), . . . , J(ϕn) ⊢L ψj.
Proof. Part (a) can be proved by a straightforward induction on the structure of ϕ using Lemma
2.3. Part (b) can be proved directly by an induction on the derivation of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢L ψ, but
it also follows from Proposition 3.2. 
Proposition 4.3. (a) If jϕ = (ϕ→ A)→ A, then ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢CQC ψ implies
J(ϕ1), . . . , J(ϕn)j ⊢IQC ψj .
(b) If jϕ = (ϕ→ ⊥)→ ⊥, then ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢CQC ψ implies J(ϕ1), . . . , J(ϕn) ⊢MQC ψj.
(c) If jϕ = ϕ ∨⊥, then ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢IQC ψ implies J(ϕ1), . . . , J(ϕn) ⊢MQC ψj.
Remark 4.4. Some nuclei commute with implication in the sense that
⊢L j(ϕ→ ψ)↔ (jϕ→ jψ);
for instance, the double-negation nucleus commutes with implication in intuitionistic logic,
but not in minimal logic. In case the nucleus commutes with implication, the clause for the
implication can be modified to
J(ϕ→ ψ): = Jϕ→ Jψ
and the previous propositions still hold. Indeed, this is what happens in Kuroda’s original
negative translation.
The following corollary is well-known and also has an easy semantic proof using Kripke
models (and, indeed, Barr’s Theorem gives a much stronger result, see, for example, [8]).
Corollary 4.5. If ϕ and ψ are coherent formulas (that is, formulas not containing universal
quantifiers or implications), then ϕ ⊢CQC ψ implies ϕ ⊢IQC ψ.
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Proof. Suppose ϕ ⊢CQC ψ and without loss of generality we may assume that ϕ and ψ are
sentences (replace free variables by fresh constants, if necessary). Part (a) from the previous
proposition gives us
ϕ ⊢IQC (ψ → A)→ A
for any sentence A. Choosing A = ψ we deduce that ϕ ⊢IQC ψ, as desired. 
The following corollary, however, is much less known. In fact, it seems it was first proved by
Johansson in unpublished correspondence with Heyting (see [9, 4]).
Corollary 4.6. If ⊢IQC ϕ then ⊢MQC Jϕ for the nucleus j given by jϕ: = ϕ ∨ ⊥.
Proof. Suppose ⊢IQC ϕ. Part (c) from the previous proposition gives us
⊢MQC J(ϕ) ∨ ⊥
for the nucleus j given by jϕ: = ϕ ∨ ⊥. But since minimal logic has the disjunction property
and does not prove ⊥, it follows that ⊢MQC Jϕ, as desired. 
5. The Kuroda-style j-translation in the literature
The observations in the previous section explain several phenomena which one may observe in
the literature. For instance, it explains Beeson’s account of forcing in a constructive metatheory
in his book [2].
If P is some partial order and we regard P as an intuitionistic Kripke frame, one can define
a nucleus internally to a Kripke model on P , as follows:
p  jϕ :⇔ (∀q ≤ p) (∃r ≤ q) r  ϕ.
Now define p s ϕ to mean p  Jϕ for this internal nucleus j. This results in the following
clauses:
p s (ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ p s ϕ ∧ p s ψ,
p s (ϕ ∨ ψ) ↔ p s ϕ ∨ p s ψ,
p s (ϕ→ ψ) ↔ (∀q ≤ p)
(
q s ϕ→ (∀r ≤ q) (∃s ≤ r) s s ψ
)
p s ∃xϕ ↔ (∃x) p s ϕ
p s ∀xϕ ↔ (∀x) (∀q ≤ p) (∃r ≤ q) r s ϕ
In fact, we can simplify the clause for the implication, because it is equivalent to:
p s (ϕ→ ψ) ↔ (∀q ≤ p)
(
q s ϕ→ (∃r ≤ q) r s ψ
)
So it follows from Proposition 4.2 that we have p  ϕj iff (∀q ≤ p) (∃r ≤ q) r s ϕ, and this is
how Beeson uses forcing in his book.
The notation p s ϕ is supposed to recall Cohen’s “strong forcing” (see [3]). In fact, his
notion of strong forcing can be obtained by changing the clause for the implication to
p s (ϕ→ ψ) ↔ (∀q ≤ p)
(
q s ϕ→ q s ψ
)
,
which works in a classical metatheory, because then one can prove that j commutes with
implication (see Remark 4.4). Indeed, in a classical metatheory p  jϕ is equivalent to p  ¬¬ϕ.
(The connection between Cohen’s strong forcing and Kuroda’s negative translation was pointed
out by Jeremy Avigad [1].)
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Another definition which can be explained by the Kuroda-style j-translation is Definition
6.1 in [7]. I do not doubt that some readers are able to come up with other examples as well.
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